We study the interaction of the programming construct "new," which generates statically scoped names, with communication via messages on channels. This interaction is crucial in security protocols, which are the main motivating examples for our work; it also appears in other programming-language contexts.
Although names, variables, and constant symbols have similarities, we find it clearer to keep them separate. A term is ground when it does not contain variables (but it may contain names and constant symbols). We use metavariables u, v, w to range over both names and variables. We abbreviate tuples u 1 , . . . ,u l and M 1 , . . . , M l to u and M, respectively.
The grammar for processes is similar to the one in the pi calculus, but here messages can contain terms (rather than only names) and names need not be just channel names: P, Q, R ::= processes (or plain processes) 0 null process P | Q parallel composition !P replication νn.P name restriction ("new") if M = N then P else Q conditional N (x ).P message input N M .P message output
The null process 0 does nothing; P | Q is the parallel composition of P and Q; the replication !P behaves as an infinite number of copies of P running in parallel. The process νn.P makes a new, private name n and then behaves as P. The conditional construct if M = N then P else Q is standard, but we should stress that M = N represents equality, rather than strict syntactic identity. We abbreviate it if M = N then P when Q is 0. Finally, N (x ).P is ready to input from channel N , then to run P with the actual message replaced for the formal parameter x, while N M .P is ready to output M on channel N , then to run P. In both of these, we may omit P when it is 0. Further, we extend processes with active substitutions:
A, B, C ::= extended processes P plain process A | B parallel composition νn.A name restriction νx.A variable restriction { M / x } active substitution
We write { M / x } for the substitution that replaces the variable x with the term M. Considered as a process, { M / x } is like let x = M in . . . , and is similarly useful. However, unlike a "let" definition, { M / x } floats and applies to any process that comes into contact with it. To control this contact, we may add a restriction: νx.({ M / x } | P ) corresponds exactly to let x = M in P. The substitution { M / x } typically appears when the term M has been sent to the environment, but the environment may not have the atomic names that appear in M; the variable x is just a way to refer to M in this situation. Although the substitution { M / x } concerns only one variable, we can build bigger substitutions by parallel composition, and may write
We write σ , { M / x }, { M / x } for substitutions; xσ for the image of x by σ ; and T σ for the result of applying σ to the free variables of T . We identify the empty substitution and the null process 0.
As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write fv(A) and fn(A) for the sets of free variables and free names of A, respectively. These sets are inductively defined, as detailed in Figure 1 . The domain dom(A) of an extended process A is the set of variables that A exports (those variables x for which A contains a substitution { M / x } not under a restriction on x). Figure 1 also defines dom(A) formally. We consider that expressions (processes and extended processes) are equal modulo renaming of bound names and variables.
We always assume that our substitutions are cycle-free; that is, by reordering, they can be written { M 1 / x 1 , . . . , M l / x l }, where x i fv(M j ) for all i ≤ j ≤ l. For instance, we exclude substitutions 1:6 M. Abadi et al. such as { f (y ) / x , f (x ) / y }. We also assume that, in an extended process, there is at most one substitution for each variable, and there is exactly one when the variable is restricted, that is, dom(A) ∩ dom(B) = ∅ in every extended process A | B, and x ∈ dom(A) in every extended process νx.A. An extended process A is closed when its free variables are all defined by an active substitution, that is, dom(A) = fv(A). We use the abbreviation ν u for the (possibly empty) series of pairwise distinct restrictions νu 1 .νu 2 . . . . νu l .
A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions of the form { M / x } by parallel composition and restriction. We let φ and ψ range over frames. Every extended process A can be mapped to a frame φ(A) by replacing every plain process embedded in A with 0. The frame φ(A) can be viewed as an approximation of A that accounts for the static knowledge exposed by A to its environment, but not for A's dynamic behavior. Assuming that all bound names and variables are pairwise distinct and do not clash with free ones, one can ignore all restrictions in a frame, thus obtaining an underlying substitution; we require that, for each extended process, this resulting substitution be cycle-free.
We rely on a sort system for terms and processes. It includes a sort Channel for channels. It may also include other sorts such as Integer, Key, or simply a universal sort for data Data. Each variable and each name comes with a sort; we write u : τ to mean that u has sort τ . There are an infinite number of variables and an infinite number of names of each sort. We typically use a, b, and c as names of sort Channel; s and k as names of some other sort (e.g., Data); and m and n as names of any sort. Function symbols also come with the sorts of their arguments and of their result. We write f : τ 1 × · · · × τ l → τ to mean that f has arguments of sorts τ 1 , . . . , τ l and a result of sort τ . Figure 2 gives the rules of the sort system. It defines the following judgments: M : τ means that M is a term of sort τ ; P means that the process P is well sorted; A means that the extended process A is well sorted. This sort system enforces that function applications are well sorted, that M and N are of the same sort in conditional expressions, that N has sort Channel in input and output expressions, that M is well sorted (with an arbitrary sort τ ) in output expressions, and that active substitutions preserve sorts. We always assume that expressions are well sorted, and that substitutions preserve sorts.
Operational Semantics
We give an operational semantics for the applied pi calculus in the now customary "chemical style" (Berry and Boudol 1992; Milner 1992) . At the center of this operational semantics is a reduction relation → on extended processes, which basically models the steps of computations.
For example, a M | a(x ).b x → b M represents the transmission of the message M on the channel a to a process that will forward the message on the channel b; the formal x is replaced with its actual value M in this reduction. The axioms for the reduction relation →, which are remarkably simple, rely on auxiliary rules for a structural equivalence relation ≡ that permits the rearrangement of processes, for example, the use of commutativity and associativity of parallel composition. Furthermore, both structural equivalence and reduction depend on an underlying equational theory. Therefore, this section introduces equational theories, then defines structural equivalence and reduction.
Given a signature Σ, we equip it with an equational theory, that is, with a congruence relation on terms that is closed under substitution of terms for variables and names. (See, e.g., Mitchell's textbook (Mitchell 1996, Chapter 3) and its references for background on universal algebra and algebraic data types from a programming-language perspective.) We further require that this equational theory respect the sort system (i.e., two equal terms are of the same sort) and that it be nontrivial (i.e., there exist two different terms in each sort).
An equational theory may be generated from a finite set of equational axioms or from rewrite rules, but this property is not essential for us. We tend to ignore the mechanics of specifying equational theories, but give several examples in Section 3.
We write Σ M = N when the equation M = N is in the theory associated with Σ. Here we keep the theory implicit, and we may even abbreviate Σ M = N to M = N when Σ is clear from context or unimportant. We write Σ M = N for the negation of Σ M = N .
As usual, a context is an expression with a hole. An evaluation context is a context whose hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output.
Structural equivalence ≡ is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that is closed by application of evaluation contexts, and such that:
The rules for parallel composition and restriction are standard. Alias enables the introduction of an arbitrary active substitution. Subst describes the application of an active substitution to a process that is in contact with it. Rewrite deals with equational rewriting. Subst implicitly requires that x : τ and M : τ for some sort τ . In combination, Alias and Subst yield A{
by Subst Using structural equivalence, every closed extended process A can be rewritten to consist of a substitution and a closed plain process with some restricted names:
where fv(P ) = ∅, fv( M ) = ∅, and { n} ⊆ fn( M ). In particular, every closed frame φ can be rewritten to consist of a substitution with some restricted names:
Internal reduction → is the smallest relation on extended processes closed by structural equivalence and application of evaluation contexts such that
Communication (Comm) is remarkably simple because the message concerned is a variable; this simplicity entails no loss of generality because Alias and Subst can introduce a variable to stand for a term:
(This derivation assumes that x fv(N ) ∪ fv(M ) ∪ fv(P ), which can be established by renaming as needed.) Comparisons (Then and Else) directly depend on the underlying equational theory. Using Else sometimes requires that active substitutions in the context be applied first, to yield ground terms M and N . For example, rule Else does not allow us to reduce { n / x } | if x = n then P else Q.
This use of the equational theory may be reminiscent of initial algebras. In an initial algebra, the principle of "no confusion" dictates that two elements are equal only if this is required by the corresponding equational theory. Similarly, if M = N then P else Q reduces to P only if this is required by the equational theory, and reduces to Q otherwise. Initial algebras also obey the principle of "no junk," which says that all elements correspond to terms built exclusively from function symbols of the signature. In contrast, a fresh name need not equal any such term in the applied pi calculus.
Variants and Extensions
Several variants of the syntax of the applied pi calculus appear in the literature, and further variants may be considered. We discuss a few:
• In the conference paper, there are several sorts for channels: the sort Channel τ is the sort of channels that convey messages of sort τ . The sort Channel without argument is more general, in the sense that all processes well sorted with Channel τ are also well sorted with Channel. Having a single sort for channels simplifies some models, for instance, when all public messages are sent on the same channel, even if they have different types. Moreover, by using Channel as only sort, we can encode an untyped version of the applied pi calculus. The tool ProVerif also uses the sort Channel without argument. • In a more refined version of the sort system, we could allow names only in a distinguished set of sorts. For instance, we could consider a sort of Booleans, containing as only values the constants true and false. Such a sort would not contain names. Sorts without names would have to be treated with special care in proofs, since our proofs often use fresh names. On the other hand, letting all sorts contain names does not prevent modeling Booleans by a sort. For example, we can treat as false all terms of the sort different from true, including not only the constant false but also all names. Analogous treatments apply to other common data types. • In the conference paper, channels in inputs and outputs are names or variables rather than any term. Allowing any term as channel yields a more general calculus and avoids some side conditions in theorems. It is also useful for some encodings (Abadi and Blanchet 2005b) . Finally, it is in line with the syntax of ProVerif, where this design choice was adopted in order to simplify the untyped version of the calculus. Nevertheless, the sort system can restrict the terms that appear as channels: if no function symbol returns a result of sort Channel, then channels can be only names or variables.
• Function symbols can also be defined by rewrite rules instead of an equational theory. This approach is taken in ProVerif (Blanchet 2009 ): a destructor д is a partial function defined by rewrite rules д(M 1 , . . . , M l ) → M; the destructor application д(N 1 , . . . , N l ) fails when no rewrite rule applies, and this failure can be tested in the process calculus. A destructor д : τ 1 × · · · × τ l → τ with rewrite rule д(M 1 , . . . , M l ) → M can be encoded in the applied pi calculus by function symbols д : τ 1 × · · · × τ l → τ and test д : τ 1 × · · · × τ l → bool with the equations
The function test д allows one to test whether д(N 1 , . . . , N l ) is defined, by checking whether test д (N 1 , . . . , N l ) = true holds. (See Section 3 for examples of such test functions.) The function д may be applied even when its arguments are not instances of (M 1 , . . . , M l ), thus yielding terms д(N 1 , . . . , N l ) that do not exist in the calculus with rewrite rules. These "stuck" terms may be simulated with distinct fresh names in that variant of the calculus.
Destructors are easy to implement in a tool. They also provide a built-in error-handling construct: the error handling is triggered when no rewrite rule applies. However, they complicate the semantics because they require a notion of evaluation of terms. Moreover, many useful functions can be defined by equations but not as destructors (for instance, encryption without redundancy, XOR, and modular exponentiation, which we use in the rest of this article). Therefore, ProVerif supports both destructors and equations (Blanchet et al. 2008) . Thus, the language of ProVerif is a superset of the applied pi calculus as defined in this article (Blanchet 2016, Chapter 4) , with the caveat that ProVerif does not support all equational theories and that it considers only plain processes.
• An extension that combines the applied pi calculus with ambients and with a built-in construct for evaluating messages as programs has also been studied (Blanchet and Aziz 2003) . This extended calculus mixes many notions, so the corresponding proofs are complex. Considering a single notion at a time yields a simpler and more elegant calculus. Furthermore, although the applied pi calculus has few primitives, it supports various other constructs via encodings; in particular, the message evaluation construct could be represented by defining an interpreter in the calculus. • Our equational theories are closed under substitution of terms for names. This property yields a simple and uniform treatment of variables and names. An alternative definition, which may suffice, assumes only that equational theories are closed under one-to-one renaming and do not equate names. That definition makes it possible to define a function that tests whether a term is a name.
Some other variations concern the definition of the semantics:
• As in other papers (Blanchet et al. 2008; Liu 2011) , we can handle the replication by a reduction step !P → P | !P instead of the structural equivalence rule !P ≡ P | !P. This modification prevents transforming P | !P into !P, and thus simplifies some proofs. • As Section 2.2 indicates, we can rewrite extended processes by pulling restrictions to the top, so that every closed extended process A becomes an extended process A • such that
where fv(P 1 | . . . | P l ) = ∅, fv( M ) = ∅, and P 1 , . . . , P l are replication, conditional, input, or output expressions. We can then modify the definitions of structural equivalence and internal reduction to act on processes in the form above. Structural equivalence says that the parallel composition P 1 | . . . | P l is associative and commutative and that the names in n can be reordered. Internal reduction is the smallest relation on closed extended processes, closed by structural equivalence, such that
for any evaluation context E. A similar idea appears in the intermediate applied pi calculus of Delaune et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2011 Liu et al. ( , 2012 . There, all restrictions not under replication are pulled to the top of processes, over conditionals, inputs, outputs, and parallel compositions; the processes P 1 , . . . , P l may be 0; and channels are names or variables. • Pushing the previous idea further, we can represent the extended process
where N is a set of names, σ is a substitution, and P is a multiset of processes. We can then define internal reduction on such configurations, without any structural equivalence. (Sets and multisets allow us to ignore the ordering of restrictions and parallel processes.) This idea is used in semantics of the calculus of ProVerif (Abadi and Blanchet 2005b; Allamigeon and Blanchet 2005; Blanchet 2009 Blanchet , 2016 .
Semantics based on global configurations are closer to abstract machines. Such semantics simplify proofs, because they leave only few choices in reductions. They also make it easier to define further extensions of the calculus, such as tables and phases in ProVerif (Blanchet 2016) . However, our compositional semantics is more convenient in order to model interactions between a process and a context. It is also closer to the traditional semantics of the pi calculus. The two kinds of semantics Pairs. Algebraic data types such as pairs, tuples, arrays, and lists occur in many examples. Encoding them in the pure pi calculus is not hard, but neither is representing them as primitive. For instance, the signature Σ may contain the binary function symbol pair and the unary function symbols fst and snd, with the abbreviation (M, N ) for pair(M, N ), and with the evident equations:
(So the equational theory consists of these equations, and all the equations obtained by reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity, applications of function symbols, and substitutions of terms for variables.) These function symbols may, for instance, be sorted as follows:
We may use the test (fst(M ), snd(M )) = M to check that M is a pair before using the values of fst(M ) and snd(M ). Alternatively, we may add a Boolean function is_pair that recognizes pairs, defined by the equation
With this equation, the conditional if is_pair(M ) = true then P else Q runs P if M is a pair and Q otherwise. Using pairs, we may, for instance, define the process:
One of its components sends a pair consisting of a term M and a fresh name s on a channel a.
The other receives a message on a and, if its second component is s, forwards the first component on a channel b. Thus, we may say that s serves as a capability (or password) for the forwarding. However, this capability is not protected from eavesdroppers when it travels on a. Any other process can listen on a and can apply snd to the message received, thus learning s. We can represent such an attacker within the calculus, for example, by the following process: a(z).a (N , snd(z)) , which may receive (M, s) on a and send (N , s) on a. Composing this attacker in parallel with the process, we may obtain N instead of M on b. Such attacks can be thwarted by the use of restricted channel names, as in the process
Alternatively, they can be thwarted by the use of cryptography, as discussed below.
Lists. We may treat lists similarly, with the following function symbols and corresponding sorts:
The constant nil is the empty list; cons(x, y) represents the concatenation of the element x at the beginning of the list y, and we write it with infix notation as x :: y, where the symbol :: associates to the right, and hd and tl are head and tail functions with the equations hd(x :: y) = x tl(x :: y) = y.
Further, we write M + + N for the concatenation of an element N at the end of a list M, where the function + + : List × Data → List associates to the left, and satisfies the equations
Cryptographic Hash Functions. We represent a cryptographic hash function as a unary function symbol h with no equations. The absence of an inverse for h models the one-wayness of h. The fact that h(M ) = h(N ) only when M = N models that h is collision-free.
Modifying our first example, we may now write the process:
νs. a (M, h((s, M ))) | a(x ).if h((s, fst(x ))) = snd(x ) then b fst(x ) .
Here the value M is authenticated by pairing it with the fresh name s and then hashing the pair. Although (M, h((s, M ))) travels on the public channel a, no other process can extract s from this message or produce (N , h((s, N ))) for some other N using the available functions. Therefore, we may reason that this process will forward only the intended term M on channel b. This example is a typical cryptographic application of hash functions. In light of the practical importance of those applications, our treatment of hash functions is attractively straightforward. Still, we may question whether our formal model of these functions is not too strong and simplistic in comparison with the properties of actual implementations based on algorithms such as SHA. In Section 6, we consider a somewhat weaker, subtler model for hash functions.
Symmetric Encryption. In order to model symmetric cryptography (i.e., shared-key cryptography), we take binary function symbols enc and dec for encryption and decryption, respectively, with the equation
Here x represents the plaintext and y the key. We often use fresh names as keys in examples; for instance, the (useless) process νk.a enc(M, k ) sends the term M encrypted under a fresh key k.
In applications of encryption, it is frequent to assume that each encrypted message comes with sufficient redundancy so that decryption with the "wrong" key is evident. Accordingly, we can test whether the decryption of M with the key k succeeds by testing whether enc(dec(M, k ), k ) = M. Alternatively, we could also add a test function test dec with the equation
Provided that we check that decryption succeeds before using the decrypted message, this model of encryption basically yields the spi calculus (Abadi and Gordon 1999) .
On the other hand, in modern cryptology, such redundancy is not usually viewed as part of the encryption function proper, but rather an addition. The redundancy can be implemented with message authentication codes. We can model an encryption scheme without redundancy with the following two equations:
These equations model that decryption is the inverse bijection of encryption, a property that is typically satisfied by block ciphers.
Asymmetric Encryption. It is only slightly harder to model asymmetric (public-key) cryptography, where the keys for encryption and decryption are different. We introduce two new unary function symbols pk and sk for generating public and private keys from a seed, and the equation dec(enc(x, pk(y)), sk(y)) = x .
We may now write the process νs. a pk(s) | b (x ).c dec(x, sk(s)) .
The first component publishes the public key pk(s) by sending it on a. The second receives a message on b, uses the corresponding private key sk(s) to decrypt it, and forwards the resulting plaintext on c. As this example indicates, we essentially view name restriction (νs) as a generator of unguessable seeds. In some cases, those seeds may be directly used as passwords or keys; in others, some transformations are needed.
Some encryption schemes have additional properties. In particular, enc and dec may be the same function. This property matters in implementations, and sometimes permits attacks. Moreover, certain encryptions and decryptions commute in some schemes. For example, we have dec(enc(x, y), z) = enc(dec(x, z), y) if the encryptions and decryptions are performed using RSA with the same modulus. The treatment of such properties is left open in the spi calculus (Abadi and Gordon 1999) . In contrast, it is easy to express the properties in the applied pi calculus and to study the protocols and attacks that depend on them.
Nondeterministic ("Probabilistic") Encryption. Going further, we may add a third argument to enc, so that the encryption of a plaintext with a key is not unique. This nondeterminism is an essential property of probabilistic encryption (Goldwasser and Micali 1984) . The equation for decryption becomes dec(enc(x, pk(y), z), sk(y)) = x .
With this variant, we may write the process
which receives a message x and uses it as an encryption key for two messages, enc(M, x, m) and enc(N , x, n). An observer who does not have the corresponding decryption key cannot tell whether the underlying plaintexts M and N are identical by comparing the ciphertexts, because the ciphertexts rely on different fresh names m and n. Moreover, even if the observer learns x, M, and N (but not the decryption key), it cannot verify that the messages contain M and N because it does not know m and n.
Public-Key Digital Signatures. Like public-key encryption schemes, digital signature schemes rely on pairs of public and private keys. In each pair, the private key serves for computing signatures and the public key for verifying those signatures. In order to model key generation, we use again the two unary function symbols pk and sk for generating public and private keys from a seed. For signatures and their verification, we use a new binary function symbol sign, a ternary function symbol check, and a constant symbol ok, with the equation check(x, sign(x, sk(y)), pk(y)) = ok.
(Several variants are possible.)
Modifying once more our first example, we may now write the process
Here the value M is signed using the private key sk(s). Although M and its signature travel on the public channel a, no other process can produce N and its signature for some other N . Therefore, again, we may reason that only the intended term M will be forwarded on channel b. This property holds despite the publication of pk(s) (but not sk(s)), which is represented by the active substitution that maps y to pk(s). Despite the restriction on s, processes outside the restriction can use pk(s) through y. In particular, y refers to pk(s) in the process that checks the signature on M.
XOR. We may model the XOR function, some of its uses in cryptography, and some of the protocol flaws connected with it. Some of these flaws (e.g., Ryan and Schneider (1998) ) stem from the intrinsic equational properties of XOR, such as associativity, commutativity, the existence of a neutral element, and the cancellation property that we may write as follows:
Others arise because of the interactions between XOR and other operations (e.g., Core SDI S.A. (1998); Stubblebine and Gligor (1992)). For example, CRCs (cyclic redundancy checks) can be poor proofs of integrity, partly because of the equation crc(xor(x, y)) = xor(crc(x ), crc(y)).
Multiplexing. Finally, we illustrate a possible usage of channels that are not names. Consider, for instance, a pairing function for building channels pair : Data × Port → Channel with its associated projections fst : Channel → Data and snd : Channel → Port, and Equations (1) and (2) from our first example. We may use this function for multiplexing as follows:
νs.(pair(s, port 1 ) M 1 | pair(s, port 2 ) M 2 | pair(s, port 1 )(x 1 ) | pair(s, port 2 )(x 2 )).
In this process, the first output can be received only by the first input, and the second output can be received only by the second input.
EQUIVALENCES AND PROOF TECHNIQUES
In examples, we frequently argue that two given processes cannot be distinguished by any context, that is, that the processes are observationally equivalent. The spi calculus developed the idea that the context represents an active attacker, and equivalences capture authenticity and secrecy properties in the presence of the attacker. More broadly, a wide variety of security properties can be expressed as equivalences.
In this section, we define observational equivalence for the applied pi calculus. We also introduce a notion of static equivalence for frames, a labeled semantics for processes, and a labeled equivalence relation. We prove that labeled equivalence and observational equivalence coincide, obtaining a convenient proof technique for observational equivalence.
Observational Equivalence
We write A ⇓a when A can send a message on name a, that is, when A → * ≡ E[a M .P] for some evaluation context E[_] that does not bind a.
Definition 4.1. An observational bisimulation is a symmetric relation R between closed extended processes with the same domain such that A R B implies:
Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest such relation.
For example, when h is a unary function symbol with no equations, we obtain that νs.a s ≈ νs.a h(s) .
These definitions are standard in the pi calculus, where ⇓a is called a barb on a, and where ≈ is one of the two usual notions of weak barbed bisimulation congruence. (See Section 4.5 and for a detailed discussion.) In the applied pi calculus, one could also define barbs on arbitrary terms, not just on names; we do not need that generalization for our purposes. The set of closing evaluation contexts for A depends only on A's domain; hence, in Definition 4.1, A and B have the same closing evaluation contexts. In Definition 4.1(2), since R is a relation between closed extended processes, we require that A also be closed. Being closed is not preserved by all reductions, since structural equivalence may introduce free unused variables. For instance, we
Although observational equivalence is undecidable in general, various tools support certain automatic proofs of observational equivalence and other equivalence relations, in the applied pi calculus and related languages (e.g., Baudet (2005) , Blanchet et al. (2008) , Chadha et al. (2012) , and Cheval et al. (2013) ).
Static Equivalence
Two substitutions may be seen as equivalent when they behave equivalently when applied to terms. We write ≈ s for this notion of equivalence and call it static equivalence. In the presence of the "new" construct, defining ≈ s is somewhat delicate and interesting. For instance, consider two functions f and g with no equations (intuitively, two independent hash functions), and the three
In φ 0 , the variables x and y are mapped to two unrelated values that are different from any value that the context may build (since k and s are new). These properties also hold, but more subtly, for φ 1 ; although f(k ) and g(k ) are based on the same underlying fresh name, they look unrelated. (Analogously, it is common to derive apparently unrelated keys by hashing from a single underlying secret, as in SSL and TLS (Dierks and Rescorla 2008; Freier et al. 1996) .) Hence, a context that obtains the values for x and y cannot distinguish φ 0 and φ 1 . On the other hand, the context can discriminate φ 2 by testing the predicate f(x ) = y. Therefore, we would like to define static equivalence so that
This example relies on a concept of equality of terms in a frame, which the following definition captures. For instance, in our example, we have (f(x ) = y)φ 2 but not (f(x ) = y)φ 1 , and hence, φ 1 ≈ s φ 2 . Depending on Σ, static equivalence can be quite hard to check, but at least it does not depend on the dynamics of processes. Some simplifications are possible in common cases, in particular when terms can be put in normal forms (e.g., in the proof of Theorems 6.1 and 6.3). Decision procedures exist for static equivalence in large classes of equational theories (Abadi and Cortier 2006) , some implemented in tools (Baudet et al. 2009a; Ciobâcă et al. 2012) .
The next lemma establishes closure properties of static equivalence: it shows that static equivalence is invariant by structural equivalence and reduction, and closed by application of closing evaluation contexts. Its proof appears in Appendix A.
As the next two lemmas demonstrate, static equivalence coincides with observational equivalence on frames, but is coarser on extended processes. Lemma 4.6. Observational equivalence is strictly finer than static equivalence on extended processes: ≈ ⊂ ≈ s .
To see that observational equivalence implies static equivalence, note that if A and B are observationally equivalent, then A | C and B | C have the same barbs for every C with fv(C) ⊆ dom(A), and that they are statically equivalent when A | C and B | C have the same barb ⇓a for every C of the special form if M = N then a n , where a does not occur in A or B and fv(C) ⊆ dom(A).
(See Lemma C.9 in Appendix C.3.) The converse does not hold, as the following counterexample shows: letting A = a n and B = b n , we have
Labeled Operational Semantics and Equivalence
A labeled operational semantics extends the chemical semantics of Section 2.2, enabling us to reason about processes that interact with their context while keeping it implicit. The labeled semantics defines a relation A α − → A , where α is a label of one of the following forms: = fv(N ) (since x does not occur in N in the latter label). In addition to the rules for structural equivalence and reduction of Section 2, we adopt the following rules:
According to In, a term M may be input. On the other hand, Out-Var permits output for terms "by reference": a fresh variable is associated with the term in question and output.
For example, using the signature and equations for symmetric encryption, and the new constant symbol oops ! , we have the sequence of transitions of Figure 3 . The first two transitions do not directly reveal the term M. However, they give enough information to the environment to compute M as dec(x, y) and to input it in the third transition.
The labeled operational semantics leads to an equivalence relation:
Definition 4.7. A labeled bisimulation is a symmetric relation R on closed extended processes such that A R B implies: (
Labeled bisimilarity (≈ l ) is the largest such relation.
Conditions 2 and 3 are standard; condition 1, which requires that bisimilar processes be statically equivalent, is necessary, for example, in order to distinguish the frames φ 0 and φ 2 of Section 4.2. As in Definition 4.1, we explicitly require that A be closed and fv(α ) ⊆ dom(A) in order to exclude transitions that introduce free unused variables.
Our main result is that this relation coincides with observational equivalence. Although such results are fairly common in process calculi, they are important and nontrivial. The proof of this theorem is outlined in Section 4.5 and completed in the appendix. The theorem implies that ≈ l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts. However, unlike the definition of ≈, the definition of ≈ l does not include a condition about contexts. It therefore permits simpler proofs.
In addition, labeled bisimilarity can probably be established via standard "bisimulation up to context" techniques (Sangiorgi 1998) , which enable useful on-the-fly simplifications in frames after output steps. We do not develop the theory of "up to context" techniques, since we do not use them in this article.
The following lemmas provide methods for simplifying frames:
Lemma 4.9 (Alias elimination). Let A and B be closed extended processes, M be a term such that fv(M ) ⊆ dom(A), and x be a variable such that x dom(A). We have A ≈ l B if and only if
Proof. Both directions follow from context closure of ≈ l for the contexts { M / x } | _ and νx._, respectively. In the converse direction, since x is not free in
Lemma 4.10 (Name disclosure). Let A and B be closed extended processes and x be a variable such that x dom(A). We have A ≈ l B if and only if
Proof. The direct implication follows from context closure of ≈ l . Conversely, we show that the relation R defined by A R B if and only if A and B are closed extended processes and
for some x dom(A) is a labeled bisimulation. This proof is detailed in Appendix D.
In Lemma 4.9, the substitution { M / x } can affect only the context, since A and B are closed. However, the lemma implies that the substitution does not give or mask any information about A and B to the context. In Lemma 4.10, the restriction on n and the substitution { n / x } mean that the context can access n only indirectly, through the free variable x. Intuitively, the lemma says that indirect access is equivalent to direct access in this case.
Our labeled operational semantics contrasts with a more naive semantics carried over from the pure pi calculus, with output labels of the form ν u.N M and rules that permit direct output of any term, such as
These rules lead to a different, finer equivalence relation, which, for example, would distinguish νk, s.a (k, s) and νk.a (f(k ), g(k )) . This equivalence relation is often inadequate in applications (as in Abadi and Gordon (1999, Section 5 .2.1)), hence our definitions.
We have also studied intermediately liberal rules for output, which permit direct output of certain terms. In particular, the rules of the conference paper permit direct output of channel names. That feature implies that it is not necessary to export variables of channel types; as Section 4.5 explains, this property is needed for Theorem 4.8 for those rules. That feature makes little sense in the present calculus, in which arbitrary terms may be used as channels, so we abandon it in the rules above. Nevertheless, certain rules with more explicit labels can still be helpful. We explain those rules next.
Making the Output Labels More Explicit
In the labeled operational semantics of Section 4.3, the labels for outputs do not reveal anything about the terms being output: those terms are represented by fresh variables. Often, however, more explicit labels can be convenient in reasoning about protocols, and they do not cause harm as long as they only make explicit information that is immediately available to the environment. For instance, for the process νk.a (Header, enc(M, k )) , the label νy.a (Header, y) is more informative than νx.a x . In this example, the environment could anyway observe that x is a pair such that fst(x ) = Header and use snd(x ) for y. More generally, we rely on the following definition to characterize the information that the environment can derive. Hence, when variables x resolve to terms M in A, they are in dom(A) and we can erase the restriction of ν x .A by applying the context { M / x } | _ and by structural equivalence. Intuitively, A does not reveal more information than ν x .A, because the environment can build the terms M and use them instead of x.
In general, when variables x are in dom(A), there exist n, M, and A such that A ≡ ν n.({ M / x } | A ). If variables x resolve to M in A, then n can be chosen empty, so that the terms M are not under restrictions. The following lemma provides two reformulations of Definition 4.11, including a converse to this observation. Its proof appears in Appendix E.
Lemma 4.12. The following three properties are equivalent:
For example, using pairs and symmetric encryption, we let (Header,enc(x,k ) ) / z }, and z resolves to (Header, y) 
In contrast, x is not always solvable in φ (for instance, when M is k).
A second lemma shows that Definition 4.11 is robust in the sense that it is preserved by static equivalence, so a fortiori by labeled bisimilarity:
Proof. Static equivalence preserves property 3 of Lemma 4.12, so we conclude by Lemma 4.12.
We introduce an alternative semantics in which the rules permit composite terms in output labels but require that every restricted variable that is exported be solvable. In this semantics, the label α in the relation A α − → A ranges over the same input labels N (M ) as in Section 4.3, and over generalized output labels of the form ν x .N M , where { x } ⊆ fv(M ) \ fv(N ). The label ν x .N M corresponds to an output of M on N that reveals the variables x. We retain the rules for structural equivalence and reduction, and rules In, Par, and Struct of Section 4.3. We also keep rule Scope, but only for labels with no extrusion, that is, for labels N (M ) and N M . This restriction is necessary because variables may not remain solvable after the application of a context νu._. As a replacement for the rule Out-Var, we use the rule Out-Term discussed in Section 4.3 and
Open-Var
These rules are more liberal than those of Section 4.3. For instance, consider A 1 = νk.a (f(k ), g(k )) and A 2 = νk.a (k, f(k )) . With the rules of Section 4.3, we have
where φ i is as in Section 4.2. With the new rules, we also have The transition in Equation (5) is the most informative for A 1 since x and y behave like fresh, independent values in φ 1 . For A 2 , we also have the more informative transition:
which reveals the link between x and y, but not that x is a name. As in this example, several output transitions are sometimes possible, each transition leading to an extended process with a different frame. In reasoning (e.g., in proving that a relation is included in labeled bisimilarity), it often suffices to consider any one of the transitions, so one may be chosen so as to limit the complexity of the resulting extended processes. We name "simple semantics" the labeled semantics of Section 4.3 and "refined semantics" the semantics of this section, and "simple labels" and "refined labels" the corresponding labels. The next theorem states that the two labeled semantics yield the same notion of equivalence. Thus, making the output labels more explicit only makes apparent some of the information that is otherwise kept in the static, equational part of labeled bisimilarity.
Theorem 4.14. Let ≈ L be the relation of labeled bisimilarity obtained by applying Definition 4.7 to the refined semantics. We have ≈ l = ≈ L .
The proof of Theorem 4.14 relies on the next two lemmas, which relate simple and refined output transitions. Theorem 4.14 is then proved as follows. By Lemma 4.16, ≈ L is a simple-labeled bisimulation, and thus ≈ L ⊆ ≈ l . Conversely, to show that ≈ l is a refined-labeled bisimulation, it suffices to prove its bisimulation property for any refined output label. This proof, which relies on Lemma 4.15, and the proofs of Lemmas 4.12, 4.15, and 4.16 are detailed in Appendix E.
Proving Theorem 4.8 (≈ = ≈ l )
A claim of Theorem 4.8 appears, without proof, in the conference version of this article for the calculus as presented in that version. There, the channels in labels cannot be variables. The claim neglects to include a corresponding hypothesis that exported variables must not be of channel type. This hypothesis is implicitly assumed, as it holds trivially for plain processes and is maintained, as an invariant, by output transitions. Without it, the two extended processes νa.({ a / x }) and νa.({ a / x } | a N ) (where the exported variable x stands for the channel a) would constitute a counterexample: they would not be observationally equivalent, but they would be bisimilar in the labeled semantics, since neither could make a labeled transition. Delaune et al. (2007 Delaune et al. ( , 2010 included the hypothesis in their study of symbolic bisimulation. Avik Chaudhuri (private communication, 2007) pointed out this gap in the statement of the theorem, and Bengtson et al. (2011) discussed it as motivation for their work on alternative calculi, the psi calculi, with a more abstract treatment of terms and a mechanized metatheory. On the other hand, Liu (2011) presented a proof of the theorem, making explicit the necessary hypothesis. Her proof demonstrated that the theorem was basically right-no radical changes or new languages were needed. More recently, Liu and others have also developed an extension of the proof for a stateful variant of the applied pi calculus (Arapinis et al. 2014) .
Theorem 4.8, in its present form, does not require that hypothesis because of some of the details of the calculus as we define it in this article. Specifically, the labeled semantics allows variables that stand for channels in labels. Therefore, extended processes such as νa.({ a / x } | a N ) can make labeled transitions.
This section outlines the proof of Theorem 4.8. The appendix gives further details, including all proofs that this section omits. Those details are fairly long and technical. In particular, they rely on a definition of "partial normal forms" for extended processes, which are designed to simplify reasoning about reductions. (In an extended process A | B, the frame of A may affect B and vice versa, so A and B may not reduce independently of each other; partial normal forms are designed to simplify the analysis of reductions in such situations.) We believe that these partial normal forms may be useful in other proofs on the applied pi calculus. In this section, we omit further specifics on partial normal forms, since they are not essential to understanding our main arguments.
The proof of Theorem 4.8 starts with a fairly traditional definition of "labeled bisimulation up to ≡": This definition implies that, if R is a labeled bisimulation up to ≡, then ≡R≡ restricted to closed processes is a labeled bisimulation (since, by Lemma 4.4, static equivalence is invariant by structural equivalence).
We use the definition to establish the following lemma:
Lemma 4.18. ≈ l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts.
In the proof of this lemma (which is given in Appendix C.2), we show that we can restrict attention to contexts of the form ν u.(_ | C). To every relation R on closed extended processes, we associate a relation R = {(ν u.(A | C), ν u.(B | C)) | A R B, ν u.(_ | C) closing for A and B}. We prove that, if R is a labeled bisimulation, then R is a labeled bisimulation up to ≡, and hence R ⊆ ≡R ≡ ⊆ ≈ l . For R = ≈ l , this property entails that ≈ l is closed by application of evaluation contexts ν u.(_ | C).
Another lemma characterizes barbs in terms of labeled transitions:
Lemma 4.19. Let A be a closed extended process. We have A ⇓a if and only if A → * ν x .a x − −−−−− → A for some fresh variable x and some A .
We then obtain Lemma 4.20, which is one direction of Theorem 4.8: Lemma 4.20. ≈ l ⊆ ≈.
Proof. We show that ≈ l satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.1, as follows:
(1) To show that ≈ l preserves barbs, we apply Lemma 4.19 and use Properties 2 and 3 of Definition 4.7.
(2) Suppose that A ≈ l B, A → * A , and A is closed. Given the trace A = A 0 → A 1 → · · · → A n = A , we instantiate all variables in n i=0 (fv(A i ) \ dom(A i )) with fresh names. This instantiation yields a trace in which all intermediate processes are closed. We can then conclude that B → * B and A ≈ l B for some B by Property 2 of Definition 4.7.
(3) ≈ l is closed by application of closing evaluation contexts by Lemma 4.18.
Moreover, ≈ l is symmetric. Since ≈ is the largest relation that satisfies these properties, we obtain ≈ l ⊆ ≈. 
A further lemma provides a way of proving the equivalence of two extended processes with the same domain by putting them in a context that binds the variables in their domain and extrudes them. Given a family of processes P i for i in a finite set I , we write i P i for the parallel composition of the processes P i if I is not empty, and 0 otherwise. Lemma 4.23. Let A and B be two closed extended processes with a same domain that contains x.
The final lemma is the other direction of Theorem 4.8:
Lemma 4.24. ≈ is a labeled bisimulation, and thus ≈ ⊆ ≈ l .
Proof. The relation ≈ is symmetric. We show that it satisfies the three properties of Definition 4.7.
(1) If A ≈ B, then A ≈ s B, by Lemma 4.6.
(2) If A ≈ B, A → A , and A is closed, then B →  *  B and A ≈ B for Hence, ≈ is a labeled bisimulation, and ≈ ⊆ ≈ l , since ≈ l is the largest labeled bisimulation.
Theorem 4.8 is an immediate consequence of Lemmas 4.20 and 4.24. Considering this proof of Theorem 4.8, we can explain further some aspects of our definition of observational equivalence (Definition 4.1). That definition includes conditions related to barbs, reductions, and evaluation contexts (Conditions (1) to (3), respectively), as is done in work on the ν -calculus (Honda and Yoshida 1995) and on the join calculus . In an alternative approach, used in CCS (Milner and Sangiorgi 1992) and in the pi calculus (Sangiorgi 1993) , equivalence is defined in two stages:
(1) First, barbed bisimilarity is defined as the largest barbed bisimulation, that is, the largest symmetric relation R such that A R B implies Conditions (1) and (2) of Definition 4.1.
(2) Second, equivalence is defined as the largest congruence (i.e., the largest relation R such that A R B implies Condition (3) of Definition 4.1) contained in barbed bisimilarity.
The two approaches do not necessarily yield the same equivalence relation; see for positive and negative examples in variants of the pi calculus. The advantage of our approach is that, in reasoning about process equivalences, we can add a context at any point after reductions, as we do in the proof of Lemma 4.24. With the alternative approach, we can add a context only at the beginning, before any reduction, so we need to build contexts that test for all possible sequences of labeled transitions that the processes under consideration may make, and that manifest them as different combinations of barbs. This testing is not possible for all processes, so with the alternative approach, analogs of Theorem 4.8 would typically require a restriction to so-called image finite processes (Milner and Sangiorgi 1992) . Our definition of observational equivalence avoids this restriction. It would be interesting to formalize the proofs of this section (and also those of the rest of the article) with a theorem prover such as Coq. This formalization may perhaps benefit from past Coq developments on bisimulations for the pi calculus (Hirschkoff 1997; Honsell et al. 2001 ) and the spi calculus (Briais 2008) . However, the applied pi calculus introduces additional difficulties (because of the role of terms with equational theories), and proving our results with Coq would certainly require a major effort.
DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY AGREEMENT
The fundamental Diffie-Hellman protocol allows two principals to establish a shared secret by exchanging messages over public channels (Diffie and Hellman 1976) . The principals need not have any shared secrets in advance. The basic protocol, on which we focus here as an example, does not provide authentication; therefore, a "bad" principal may play the role of either principal in the protocol. On the other hand, the two principals that follow the protocol will communicate securely with one another afterward, even in the presence of active attackers. In extended protocols, such as the Station-to-Station protocol (Diffie et al. 1992 ) and SKEME (Krawczyk 1996) , additional messages perform authentication.
We program the basic protocol in terms of the binary function symbol f and the unary function symbol g, with the equation f(x, g(y)) = f(y, g(x )).
( 6) Concretely, the functions are f(x, y) = y x mod p and g(x ) = α x mod p for a prime p and a generator α of Z * p , and we have the equation f(x, g(y)) = (α y ) x = α y×x = α x ×y = (α x ) y = f(y, g(x )). However, we ignore the underlying number theory, working abstractly with f and g.
The protocol has two symmetric participants, which we represent by the processes A 0 and A 1 . The protocol establishes a shared key, then the participants respectively run P 0 and P 1 using the key. We use the public channel c 01 for messages from A 0 to A 1 and the public channel c 10 for communication in the opposite direction. (Although the use of two distinct public channels is of no value for security, it avoids some trivial confusions and so makes for a cleaner presentation.) We assume that none of the values introduced in the protocol appear in P 0 and P 1 , except for the key.
In order to establish the key, A 0 invents a name n 0 and sends g(n 0 ) to A 1 , and A 1 proceeds symmetrically. Then A 0 computes the key as f(n 0 , g(n 1 )) and A 1 computes it as f(n 1 , g(n 0 )), with the same result. We find it convenient to use the following substitutions for A 0 's message and key:
and the corresponding substitutions σ 1 and ϕ 1 , as well as the frame
With these notations, A 0 is
and A 1 is analogous.
Two reductions represent a normal run of the protocol:
The two communication steps (Equation (7)) use structural equivalence to activate the substitutions σ 0 and σ 1 and extend the scope of the secret values n 0 and n 1 . The structural equivalence (Equation (8)) crucially relies on Equation (6) in order to reuse the active substitution ϕ 0 instead of ϕ 1 after the reception of x 0 in A 1 . The next structural equivalence (Equation (9)) tightens the scope for restricted names and variables, then uses the definition of φ. We model an eavesdropper as a process c 01 (x 0 ).c 01 x 0 .c 10 (x 1 ).c 10 x 1 .P that intercepts messages on c 01 and c 10 , remembers them, but forwards them unmodified. Using the labeled semantics to represent the interaction of A 0 | A 1 with such a passive attacker, we obtain
The labeled transitions
− −−−− → show that the eavesdropper obtains the message sent on c 01 by A 0 , stores it in x 0 , and forwards it to A 1 . The transitions
− −−−− → deal with the message on c 10 in a similar way. The absence of the restrictions on x 0 and x 1 corresponds to the fact that the eavesdropper has obtained the values of these variables.
The following theorem relates this process to
which represents the bodies P 0 and P 1 of A 0 and A 1 sharing a key k. This key appears as a simple shared name, rather than as the result of communication and computation. Intuitively, we may read νk.(P 0 | P 1 ){ k / y } as the ideal outcome of the protocol: P 0 and P 1 execute using a shared key, without concern for how the key was established, and without any side effects from weaknesses in the establishment of the key. The theorem says that this ideal outcome is essentially achieved, up to some "noise." This "noise" is a substitution that maps x 0 and x 1 to unrelated, fresh names. It accounts for the fact that an attacker may have the key-exchange messages, and that they look just like unrelated values to the attacker. In particular, the key in use between P 0 and P 1 has no observable relation to those messages, or to any other leftover secrets. We view this independence of the shared key as an important forward-secrecy property.
Theorem 5.1. Let P 0 and P 1 be processes with free variable y where the name k does not appear. We have νy.
Proof. The theorem follows from Lemma 4.5 and the static equivalence φ ≈ s νs 0 , s 1 , k.{ s 0 / x 0 , s 1 / x 1 , k / y }, which says that the frame φ generated by the protocol execution is equivalent to one that maps variables to fresh names. This static equivalence is proved automatically by ProVerif, using the technique presented in Blanchet et al. (2008) . We conclude by applying the context νy.(P 0 | P 1 | _).
Extensions of the basic protocol add rounds of communication that confirm the key and authenticate the principals. We have studied one such extension with key confirmation. There, the shared secret f(n 0 , g(n 1 )) is used in confirmation messages. Because of these messages, the shared secret can no longer be equated with a virgin key for P 0 and P 1 . Instead, the final key is computed by hashing the shared secret. This hashing guarantees the independence of the final key. We have also studied more advanced protocols that rely on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange, such as the JFK protocol (Aiello et al. 2004 ). The analysis of JFK in the applied pi calculus illustrates the composition of manual reasoning with invocations of ProVerif.
HASH FUNCTIONS AND MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODES
Section 3 briefly discusses cryptographic hash functions. In this section, we continue their study, and also treat message authentication codes (MACs). We consider constructions of both hash functions and MACs. These examples provide a further illustration of the usefulness of equations in the applied pi calculus. On the other hand, some aspects of the constructions are rather low level, and we would not expect to account for all their combinatorial details (e.g., the "birthday attacks" (Menezes et al. 1996)) . A higher-level task is to express and reason about protocols treating hash functions and MACs as primitive; this is squarely within the scope of our approach.
Using MACs
MACs serve to authenticate messages using shared keys. When k is a key and M is a message, and k is known only to a certain principal A and to the recipient B of the message, B may take mac(k, M ) as proof that M comes from A. More precisely, B can check mac(k, M ) by recomputing it upon receipt of M and mac(k, M ), and reason that A must be the sender of M. This property should hold even if A generates MACs for other messages as well; those MACs should not permit forging a MAC for M. In the worst case, it should hold even if A generates MACs for other messages on demand.
Using a new binary function symbol mac, we may describe this scenario by the following processes: mac(k, x ) )
The process S represents the complete system, composed of A and B; the restriction on k means that k is private to A and B. The process A receives messages on a public channel a and returns them MACed on the public channel b. When B receives a message on b, it checks its MAC and acts upon it, here simply by forwarding on a channel c. Intuitively, we would expect that B forwards on c only a message that A has MACed. In other words, although an attacker may intercept, modify, and inject messages on b, it should not be able to forge a MAC and trick B into forwarding some other message. Hence, every message output on c equals a preceding input on a, as illustrated in Figure 4 .
This property can be expressed precisely in terms of the labeled semantics and it can be checked without too much difficulty when mac is a primitive function symbol with no equations. The property remains true even if there is a function extract that maps a MAC mac(x, y) to the underlying cleartext y, with the equation extract(mac(x, y)) = y. Since MACs are not supposed to guarantee secrecy, such a function may well exist, so it is safer to assume that it is available to the attacker.
The property is more delicate if mac is defined from other operations, as it invariably is in practice. In that case, the property may even be taken as the specification of MACs (Goldwasser and Bellare 1999) . Thus, a MAC implementation may be deemed correct if and only if the process S works as expected when mac is instantiated with that implementation. More specifically, the next section deals with the question of whether the property remains true when mac is defined from hash functions.
Constructing Hash Functions and MACs
In Section 3, we give no equations for hash functions. In practice, following Merkle and Damgård, hash functions are commonly defined by iterating a basic binary compression function, which maps two input blocks to one output block (Menezes et al. 1996) . Furthermore, keyed hash functions include a key as an additional argument. Thus, we may have h(x, y 0 :: y 1 :: z) = h(f(x, y 0 ), y 1 :: z)
h(x, y :: nil) = f(x, y).
Here, we use the sorts Block for blocks and BlockList for sequences of blocks, defined as lists as in Section 3, with sorts Block and BlockList instead of Data and List, respectively. The function h : Block × BlockList → Block is the keyed hash function; f : Block × Block → Block is the compression function.
In these equations, we are rather abstract in our treatment of blocks, their sizes, and therefore padding and other related issues. We also ignore two common twists: some functions use initialization vectors to start the iteration, and some append a length block to the input. Nevertheless, we can explain various MAC constructions, describing flaws in some and reasoning about the properties of others.
A first, classical definition of a MAC from a keyed hash function h is (1) and (2) of Section 3. In Figures 5 and 6 , we see that the message M that the system MACs differs from the message M + + N that it forwards on c. These transitions are not enabled with the primitive MAC of Section 6.1; hence, S with the proposed MAC implementation is not labeled bisimilar to S with the primitive MAC.
There are several ways to address extension attacks, and indeed the literature contains many MAC constructions that are not subject to these attacks. We have considered some of them. Here we describe a construction that uses the MAC key twice: h(x, y) ).
Under this definition, the MAC of M = M 1 :: M 2 ::
, and the process S forwards on c only a message that it has previously MACed, as desired.
Looking beyond the case of S, we can prove a more general result by comparing the situation where mac is primitive (and has no special equations) and one with the definition of mac(x, y) as f(x, h(x, y)). Given a name k and an extended process C that uses the symbol mac, we write [[C]] for the translation of C in which the definition of mac is expanded wherever the key k is used, with f(k, h(k, M )) replaced for mac(k, M ). The theorem says that this translation yields an equivalent process (so, intuitively, the constructed MACs work as well as the primitive ones). It applies to a class of equational theories generated by rewrite rules. Theorem 6.1. Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with an equational theory generated by a convergent rewrite system such that mac and f do not occur in the left-hand sides of rewrite rules; the only rewrite rules with h at the root of the left-hand side are those of Equations (10) and (11) oriented from left to right; there are no rewrite rules with :: nor nil at the root of the left-hand side; and names do not occur in rewrite rules. Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as first argument of mac in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk. [[C] ].
In the proof of this theorem (which is given in Appendix F), we use the same notion of partial normal form as in the proof of Theorem 4.8. We define a relation R by A R B if and only if A and B are closed, A ≡ νk.C, B ≡ νk. [[C] ], C is a closed extended process in partial normal form, and the name k appears only as MAC key in C. We show that the relation R ∪ R −1 (i.e., the union of R with its inverse relation) is a labeled bisimulation. Static equivalence follows from the preservation of equality by the translation [[ · ]] for terms in which k occurs only as MAC key; reductions commute with the translation [[ · ]] and preserve the restriction on the occurrences of the key k. We conclude by Theorem 4.8. An alternative proof of similar complexity would show that R ∪ R −1 is an observational bisimulation. Theorem 6.1 considers a single MAC key at a time. For an extended process with several MAC keys k 1 , . . . , k n , we can apply Theorem 6.1 once for each key k i , using structural equivalence to move each restriction νk i to the root of the extended process. Theorem 6.1 allows cryptographic primitives other than hash functions and MACs, provided the assumptions on the equational theory are satisfied. The following corollary states a simple special case for the primitives mentioned in this section. It suffices for treating the system S. Corollary 6.2. Suppose that the signature Σ is equipped with the equational theory defined by Equations (1), (2), (3), (4) , (10), and (11) . Suppose that C is closed and the name k appears only as a first argument of mac in C. Then νk.C ≈ νk. [[C] ].
Constructing Robust Hash Functions
Constructions of hash functions, of the kind described in Section 6.2, typically impose constraints on the use of these functions. For example, some care is needed in order to thwart extension attacks in the definition of MACs. The possibility of such attacks stems from structural flaws in the constructions; details such as the iteration of a compression function are not completely hidden, lead to unwanted additional properties, and can be exploited.
A line of work in cryptography studies safer hash functions with stronger guarantees (Coron et al. 2005) . Although these functions are generally built much as in Section 6.2 by iterating a compression function, their design conceals their inner structure. The functions thus aim to behave like abstract "random oracles" on inputs of arbitrary length. A notion of indifferentiability captures this goal.
In this section, as a final, more advanced example, we describe one design that strengthens the Merkle-Damgård approach, following Coron et al. (2005, Section 3.4) . In this example, the attacker is given only indirect access to functions, such as the hash function h. We model this restriction by inserting a private name k as the first argument of h. (Cryptographically, the name k may reflect the initial random sampling of h.) We refer to this argument as a key, of sort Key. We use sorts Block for blocks and BlockList for sequences of blocks, defined as lists as in Section 3, with sorts Block and BlockList instead of Data and List, respectively. We use sort Block2 for pairs of blocks, with pair : Block × Block → Block2, fst : Block2 → Block, and snd : Block2 → Block; the abbreviation (x, y) for pair(x, y); and the equations fst((x, y)) = x snd((x, y)) = x (fst(x ), snd(x )) = x .
The third equation of (12) is not present in Section 3; it models that all elements of sort Block2 are pairs. We use sort Block3 for pairs of a Block2 and a Block defined in the same way with overloaded function symbols pair, fst, and snd, and sort Bool for Booleans. We define the hash function h :
where
h 2 (k, x, y :: z) = h 2 (k, f(k, (x, y) ), z).
The function h 2 : Key × Block2 × BlockList → Block uses a compression function f : Key × Block3 → Block2. In h 2 (k, x, z), the variable x represents the fixed-size internal state of the hash function and z is the remainder of the input. The internal state starts at (0, 0) and is updated by applications of the compression function f as input blocks are processed. Finally, only the first half of the internal state is returned.
For instance, the hash of a two-block message M = M 1 :: M 2 :: nil with key k is h(k, M ) = fst(f(k, (f(k, ((0, 0), M 1 )), M 2 ))). More generally, we have h(k, M 1 :: . . . :: M n :: nil) = fst(f(k, (. . . f(k, ((0, 0), M 1 )) . . . , M n ))).
Indifferentiability requires that the hash function behave like a black box (like a "random oracle"), even in interaction with an adversary that also has access to the underlying compression function. The compression function and the hash function are related, of course. However, as far as the adversary can tell, it is the compression function that may be defined from the hash function (in fact, from an ideal hash function without equations as in Section 3) rather than the other way around. Thus, we express indifferentiability as the equivalence of two systems, each of which provides access to the hash function and the compression function. In the applied pi calculus, one of the systems is νk.
.c f f(k, x ) answer requests to evaluate h and f with key k. We restrict ourselves to hashes of nonempty sequences of blocks. In practice, one never hashes the empty string, because the input of the hash function is padded to a nonzero multiple of the block length. This restriction is important in this example, because the definition of h yields h(k, nil) = 0, and this special hash value would break indifferentiability. In order to enforce this restriction, we use symbols true : Bool and ne_list : BlockList → Bool, with equations ne_list(x :: nil) = true ne_list(x :: y :: z) = ne_list(y :: z).
The term ne_list(M ) is equal to true when M is a nonempty list.
The other system offers an analogous interface for an ideal hash function h : Key × BlockList → Block and for a stateful compression function built from h :
νk.(A 1
h | A 1 f ). The process A 1 h answers requests to evaluate an ideal hash function h :
.if ne_list(y) = true then c h h (k, y) and A 1 f simulates the compression function using h . The code for A 1 f , which is considerably more intricate, captures the core of the security argument as it might appear in the cryptography literature. (The paper by Coron et al. (2005) omits this argument and, as far as we know, this argument does not appear elsewhere.)
RELATED WORK
This section aims to position the applied pi calculus with respect to research on process calculi and on the analysis of security protocols. As discussed in Section 1, the applied pi calculus has been the basis for much further work since its initial publication; this section does not discuss many papers that build on the applied pi calculus. (Some of those papers, and others, are mentioned elsewhere in this article.)
Process Calculi
The applied pi calculus has many commonalities with the original pi calculus (Milner 1999 ) and its relatives, such as the spi calculus (Abadi and Gordon 1999 ) (discussed in Sections 3 and 4). In particular, the model of communication adopted in the applied pi calculus is deliberately classical: communication is through named channels, and value computation is rather separate from communication. Furthermore, active substitutions are reminiscent of the constraints of the fusion calculus (Victor 1998) . They are especially close to the substitution environments that Boreale et al. employ in their proof techniques for a variant of the spi calculus with a symmetric cryptosystem (Boreale et al. 1999) . We incorporate substitutions into processes, systematize them, and generalize from symmetric cryptosystems to arbitrary operations and equations.
Extensions of the pi calculus are not limited to modeling cryptography: many extensions and variants of the pi calculus have been designed for diverse applications. Examples include calculi for mobility, such as the ambient calculus (Cardelli and Gordon 2000) ; calculi for modeling biological processes, such as the enhanced pi calculus (Curti et al. 2004) ; and calculi for service-oriented computing, which model the contracts that services implement, the composition of services, and their protocols (Buscemi and Montanari 2007; Cruz-Filipe et al. 2014; Lapadula et al. 2007; Lucchi and Mazzara 2007) . The psi calculi (Bengtson et al. 2011 ) provide a general framework parameterized by nominal data types for terms, conditions (generalizing comparison between terms), and assertions (generalizing our notion of frames) and their operational semantics. They also give sufficient conditions on these parameters to ensure that the resulting observational equivalence coincides with labeled bisimilarity. The framework accommodates encodings of the pi calculus and several of its variants, for example, ones with fusion (Wischik and Gardner 2004) and concurrent constraints (Buscemi and Montanari 2007). In particular, Bengtson et al. give an encoding of the applied pi calculus in their framework. However, as they explain, the result of this encoding differs from the applied pi calculus in the way processes interact with contexts. In particular, an important difference is that, when an encoded process sends a ciphertext, the ciphertext appears on the label of the transition, and an agent that receives this message will immediately learn the cleartext and the key. In psi calculi, one can avoid such counterintuitive disclosures by explicitly creating and using aliases. A recent extension of psi calculi (Borgström et al. 2014 (Borgström et al. , 2016 addresses these difficulties with a new form of pattern matching. In contrast, the management of aliases is built into the applied pi calculus, facilitating the modeling of security protocol attackers as contexts.
Analysis of Security Protocols
The analysis of a security protocol generally requires reasoning about its possible executions. However, the ways of talking about the executions and their properties vary greatly. We use a process calculus whose semantics provides a detailed specification for interactions with a context. Because the process calculus has a proper "new" construct (like the pi calculus but unlike CSP), it provides a direct account of the generation of new keys and other fresh quantities. It also enables reasoning with equivalence and implementation relations.
Reasoning with those relations is often more challenging than reasoning about trace properties, but it can be worthwhile. Equivalences are useful, in particular, for modeling privacy properties (Pfitzmann and Köhntopp 2001) , for instance, in electronic voting (Delaune et al. 2009 ). While proofs of equivalences are difficult to automate in general-and observational equivalence is undecidable as noted in Section 4.1-several tools support certain automatic proofs of equivalences in the applied pi calculus and similar languages: tools have focused on establishing particular kinds of equivalences such as trace equivalence for bounded processes (i.e., processes without replication) (Chadha et al. 2012; Cheval et al. 2013; Tiu and Dawson 2010) or for restricted classes of unbounded processes (Chrétien et al. 2015a (Chrétien et al. , 2015b . Although ProVerif initially focused on proofs of trace properties (Blanchet 2009 ), it also supports automatic proofs of diff-equivalences, which are equivalences between processes that share the same structure and differ only in the choice of terms (Blanchet et al. 2008) . A diff-equivalence between two processes requires that the two processes reduce in the same way, in the presence of any adversary. In particular, the two processes must have the same branching behaviour. Hence, diff-equivalence is much stronger than observational equivalence. Maude-NPA (Santiago et al. 2014) and Tamarin (Basin et al. 2015) also employ that notion. Baudet (2005 Baudet ( , 2007 showed that diff-equivalence is decidable for bounded processes: he treated a class of equivalences that model security against offline guessing attacks in Baudet (2005) and proved the full result in Baudet (2007) .
Furthermore, the use of a process calculus permits treating security protocols as programs written in a programming notation-subject to typing (Abadi 1999; Cardelli 2000; Gordon and Jeffrey 2004) , to other static analyses (Bodei et al. 1998) , and to translations (Abadi 1998; Abadi et al. , 2000 . Thus, language-based approaches have led to tools such as ProVerif where protocols can be described by programs and analyzed using automated techniques that leverage type systems and Horn clauses (Abadi and Blanchet 2005a) .
The applied pi calculus is also convenient as an intermediate language. Translations to ProVerif have been implemented from TulaFale (a language for standardized web services protocols) (Bhargavan et al. 2003) , from F# (Bhargavan et al. 2008b) , and from JavaScript in order to verify protocols, including TLS (Bhargavan et al. 2008a) .
As in many other works (e.g., Abadi and Gordon (1999) , Amadio and Lugiez (2000), Armando et al. (2005) , Cremers (2008) , Dam (1998 ), DeMillo et al. (1982 , Dolev and Yao (1983) , Escobar et al. (2006) , Kemmerer et al. (1994) , Lowe (1996 ), Merritt (1983 , Mitchell et al. (1997) , Paulson (1998), Schmidt et al. (2012 ), Schneider (1996 ), and Thayer Fábrega et al. (1998 ), our use of the applied pi calculus conveniently avoids matters of computational complexity and probability. In contrast, other techniques for the analysis of security protocols employ more concrete computational models, where principals are basically Turing machines that manipulate bitstrings, and security depends on the computational limitations of attackers (e.g., Bellare and Rogaway (1993) , Goldwasser and Bellare (1999) , Goldwasser and Micali (1984) , Goldwasser et al. (1988) , and Yao (1982)).
Although these two approaches remained rather distinct during the 1980s and 1990s, fruitful connections have now been established (e.g., Abadi et al. (2009) , Abadi and Rogaway (2002) , Backes et al. (2009) , Barthe et al. (2010) , Blanchet (2006) , Blanchet and Pointcheval (2006) , Comon-Lundh and Cortier (2008) , Datta et al. (2005) , Lincoln et al. (1998), and Pfitzmann et al. (2000) ). In particular, some work interprets symbolic proofs in terms of concrete, bitstring-based models (Abadi and Rogaway 2002) , in some cases specifically studying the "computational soundness" of the applied pi calculus (Backes et al. 2009; Baudet et al. 2009b; Comon-Lundh and Cortier 2008) . Other work focuses directly on those concrete models but benefits from notations and ideas from process calculi and programming languages. For example, the tool CryptoVerif (Blanchet 2006; Blanchet and Pointcheval 2006) provides guarantees in terms of bitstrings, running times, and probabilities, but its input language is strongly reminiscent of the applied pi calculus, which influenced it-rather than of Turing machines.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we describe a uniform extension of the pi calculus, the applied pi calculus, in which messages may be compound values, not just channel names. We study its theory, developing its semantics and proof techniques. Although the calculus has no special, built-in features to deal with security, it has proved useful in the analysis of security protocols.
Famously, the pi calculus is the language of those lively social occasions where all conversations are exchanges of names. The applied pi calculus opens the possibility of more substantial, structured conversations; the cryptic character of some of these conversations can only add to their charm and to their tedium.
The previous paragraph closed the conference paper that introduced the applied pi calculus in 2001. We are now in a better position to assess the possibility to which it refers. As we hoped in 2001, the applied pi calculus has been extensively used for modeling and for reasoning about security protocols, particularly ones that rely heavily on cryptography (and less for ones that rely on simple capabilities). The flexibility of the applied pi calculus is a key enabler for those applications. This flexibility did not render unnecessary or uninteresting the exploration of variants and extensions. However, it did allow the applied pi calculus to remain a relevant core system-it was not displaced by an extended language with many more constructs.
We are also in a better position to comment on matters of charm and tedium, alas. It is debatable whether security protocols have become more charming or more tedious since 2001. It is clear, however, that they play an ever-growing role, and that their security remains problematic. The evolution of TLS exemplifies these points. The literature now contains many attacks on TLS (e.g., Adrian et al. (2015) , Aviram et al. (2016) , Bhargavan et al. (2014a) , and Vanhoef and Piessens (2015) ), but also several partial specifications and proofs (Cremers et al. 2016; Jager et al. 2012; Krawczyk et al. 2013; Paterson et al. 2011) , sometimes relying on the applied pi calculus (Bhargavan et al. 2017a , and sometimes with language-based methods of the kind that the applied pi calculus started to explore (Bhargavan et al. 2014b (Bhargavan et al. , 2013 . The state-of-the-art approaches (Bhargavan et al. 2017a (Bhargavan et al. , 2017b (Bhargavan et al. , 2014b (Bhargavan et al. , 2013 Jager et al. 2012; Krawczyk et al. 2013; Paterson et al. 2011 ) rely on refined frameworks that consider matters of computational complexity and probability, which are beyond the (explicit) scope of the applied pi calculus, as explained above. In such applications, tools play a helpful role, often an essential one. Although they sometimes lead to important insights, manual proofs-in particular, manual proofs of equivalences-can be rather painful and tedious. (We may have suspected this fact in 2001; on the basis of our experience since then, we now know it with certainty.) On the other hand, the relative ease of use of ProVerif has contributed greatly to the spread of the applied pi calculus. The applied pi calculus has evolved through its implementation in ProVerif, and as a result of its use in this context. That evolution is, in our opinion, an improvement, so the present article, aims to reflect it.
Finally, independently of the merits and the future of the applied pi calculus, we believe that languages, and in particular the formalization of attackers as contexts, should continue to play a role in the analysis of security protocols. The alternatives (defining protocols as interacting Turing machines?) are not easier. Describing protocols in a programming notation not only makes them precise but also brings them into the realm where ideas and tools from programming can support analysis.
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